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The Royal Commission on Taxation, in its proposals for ta \  
reform, stated that it assigned the objective of equity the highest 
priority since it considered that the record of the past indicated 
clearly that a social and political system could not be strong and 
enduring if the people became convinced that the tax structure did 
not distribute the tax burden fairly among the citizens.1 In the 
Commission’s view equity would be best achieved if taxes were 
allocated in proportion to the discretionary economic power of 
the taxpayer and this required that any proposed tax base take 
into account all of a person’s net gains.2
The White Paper, on the other hand, does not accord this 
priority position to equity but rather indicates that “a number of 
goals and standards have guided the government in its approach 
to reform”. It recognizes that “important forms of income and 
benefits escape taxation” and “proposes to bring them into taxable 
income” mainly through the introduction of a tax on capital 
gains.1 Although one of its professed goals is “a fair distribution 
of the tax burden based upon ability to pay” it states neverthe­
less that:
The government rejects the proposition that every increase in 
economic power, no matter what its source, should be treated the 
same for tax purposes.4
How, then, do the proposals for reform in the White Paper 
compare with those of the Carter Commission? Does the failure 
to accord first priority to equity lead to significant consequences? 
Will the White Paper proposals ensure that all important forms of 
income and benefits will be brought into taxable income so as to 
produce “a fair distribution of the tax burden based upon ability- 
to pay”? Finally, how would such a reformed tax system com­
pare with the tax systems in the United Kingdom and in the 
United States in terms of equity?
Horizontal and Vertical Equity
The Carter Commission stressed th a t:
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Equity has two dimensions. Horizontal equity requires that 
individuals and families in similar circumstances bear the same 
taxes. Vertical equity requires that those in different circum­
stances bear appropriately different taxes.5
The White Paper says essentially the same thing6 although it does 
not use the terms “horizontal” and “vertical” equity. Its recom­
mendations would significantly improve horizontal equity through 
a number of proposals. For the first time all taxpayers will be 
permitted to average their incomes over a five year period, some­
thing not yet possible in either the United States or the United 
Kingdom. There is to be included in taxable income unemploy­
ment compensation, adult training allowances, fellowships, scholar­
ships, research grants, and bursaries (subject to the deduction of 
certain educational expenses) while deductions are to be per­
mitted from income for the expenses of child care (where both 
parents work or where there is only one parent who is also em­
ployed) and for certain employment expenses of employees who 
receive wages or salary. Horizontal equity is also to be improved 
among high income taxpayers by taxing capital gains. The White 
Paper points out that:
The present exemption has also led to an unfair tax load on 
those high-income Canadians who do not have capital gains. In 
an attempt to be sure that the rich as a class pay a higher pro­
portion of their income as tax than do the less well off, govern­
ments have imposed very high rates on the part of their income 
that is taxed.7
The White Paper also presents the arguments for the taxation 
of capital gains, in order to ensure both horizontal and vertical 
equity, as follows:
The government has decided to include capital gains . . .  in 
income subject to tax. Reviews of this subject by the royal com­
mission and the government led to the conclusion that this is 
essential in order to be fair between those receiving such gains 
and others deriving their income from other sources. Moreover 
the taxation of gains is essential to block loopholes effectively.
Those who make substantial capital gains in the stock market 
or in real estate increase their ability to spend money just as those 
who earn wages or derive an income from carrying on busi­
ness.8
Thus Mr. Benson seems to recognize, as did the Royal Com­
mission, that capital gains are income and that they must be
s Report of the Royal Commission on Taxation, op. cit supra fn. 1, vol.
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included in taxable income if we are to have an equitable tax 
system. But will the White Paper proposals ensure that capital 
gains will be brought into the tax system in an equitable manner?
Proposals for the Taxation of Capital Gains
Mr. Benson’s proposals for the taxation of capital gains are as 
follows:
In general we propose to include capital gains fully in income for 
most classes of assets whenever they are realized by  the sale of 
such assets . . . .fl
. . .  all or part of the capital losses suffered by a taxpayer 
would be deductible from taxable income and so save the tax­
payer tax at the marginal rate.10
. . . the government proposes that capital gains not be accrued 
at the time of death but that the person who inherits the assets 
be treated as if he had purchased them at their cost to the de­
ceased.11
The White Paper also adopts Carter’s recommendation that when 
capital gains are brought into income for tax the marginal rate of 
tax should be reduced to approximately fifty per cent.
The decision not to provide for a deemed realization at death 
means that a high degree of horizontal and vertical inequity will 
remain in the tax system. The Royal Commission had emphasized 
that, in order to ensure equity, capital gains should be taxed on an 
accrual basis12 pointing out that:
It is essential to recognize that the postponement of taxes is 
equivalent to the reduction of taxes; indefinite postponement is 
equivalent to the eliminaUon of a tax.13
However, the Commission concluded that, because of administra­
tive difficulties, it could not recommend an accrual system of 
taxing capital gains at that time14 but it did propose that all such 
gains be accrued at death. As Conway15 pointed out, the omission 
of a deemed realization at death permits accrued gains to be passed 
on indefinitely without ever being subjected to tax.
9 Ibid. Emphasis added.
10 Ibid., p. 38.
11 Ibid., p. 42.
Report of the Royal Commission on Taxation, op. cit. supra fn. 1, 
vol. 3, pp. 378-80.
,a Ibid.. vol. 1, p. 21.
14 Ibid.. vol. 3, p. 380.
15 Geoffrey A. Conway, The Taxation o f Capital Gains, Studies of the 
Royal Commission on Taxation (Ottawa, 1968), Number 19, p.223.
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Mr. Benson’s explanation for failing to provide for a deemed 
realization at death is that:
. . . two taxes could apply at the same time . . . .  Further, these 
taxes could apply at a most inconvenient time.1"
Why “convenience” for some taxpayers should suddenly take 
precedence over “equity” for all taxpayers is not clear. There was 
no mention of “inconvenience” when it was proposed that unem­
ployment compensation and scholarships be taxed yet the taxation 
of such benefits is likely to be highly inconvenient to the taxpayer. 
Carter showed the inequity of failing to tax capital gains at death 
when he said:
For example, one could compare the lifetime tax burden of two 
taxpayers with identical lifetime economic incomes, on the as­
sumption that one taxpayer died the day after liquidating all his 
assets, while the second taxpayer died before any such liquida­
tion. The tax capacity of the two taxpayers would be identical, 
but their tax liabilities could be drastically different, and would 
be equalized only if there were a deemed disposition for tax pur­
poses on the death of the second taxpayer.17
Admittedly the White Paper proposals represent some im­
provement over the United States system where accrued gains are, 
in effect, forgiven at death. However, this provision of the 
American tax law has never been regarded as equitable. Martin 
David said:
. . . providing for presumptive realization of gains upon the trans­
fer of assets would eliminate the most inequitable tax advantages 
that arise from the present capital gains tax. The revenue obtained 
could be used to reduce substantially the tax rates on upper- 
income groups.18
In the United Kingdom, where a tax on capital gains was intro­
duced in 1965, accrued gains are subject to tax at death although 
there is an exemption for five thousand pounds of gains, and up 
to ten thousand pounds of gains may be exempted where they 
result from the disposal of a family business anytime after the 
age of sixty.19
The proposal to permit an apparently unlimited loss deduc­
tion against ordinary income while not requiring any deemed 
realization even at death would appear to make the tax system
16 Benson, op. cit. supra fn. 3, p. 42.
17 Report of the Royal Commission on Taxation, op. cit. supra fn. I. 
vol. 3, p. 369.
** Martin David, Alternative Approaches to Capital Gains Taxation 
(Washington, 1968), pp. 163-164.
G. S. A. Wheatcroft and A. E. W. Park. Wheatcroft on Capital Gains 
Taxes (London, 1967), ss. 2.01, 16.43.
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even more inequitable than it is at present. Mr. Benson, in re­
ferring to the need for certain transitional provisions when a 
capital gains tax is introduced, says:
It would be perverse if a change that was designed to increase 
the percentage of the income of the wealthy that is brought to tax 
should in this particular instance create an exemption for the 
speculator.20
Yet this appears to be precisely what he has done in respect to 
the long-run arrangements, since it would appear to be possible 
for taxpayers to realize their losses and use them to offset ordinary 
income while not being required ever to bring their gains into 
income for tax purposes. As Conway has pointed out:
. . . every country reviewed that has taxed capital gains has also 
found it necessary to limit the deductibility of capital losses to 
protect the revenue and as a safeguard against income manipula­
tion by the taxpayer.21 
The United Kingdom only permits losses to be used to offset gains 
(even though it has a provision for a deemed realization at death) 
while in the United States any losses unused in this way can be 
offset against ordinary income, but only to the extent of one 
thousand dollars a year (although there is no time limit on the 
carryover of such losses). Mr. Benson has recognized the in­
equity of permitting the deduction of losses from ordinary income 
when gains do not have to be brought into tax in the case of his 
proposal to bring gains and losses into income for tax every five 
years, in the case of the shares of “widely-held Canadian corpora­
tions” ; he has since pointed out, in a press release of March 10th, 
that if the deemed realization every five years, in the case of such 
shares, were to be dropped, the right to offset losses against or­
dinary income would have to be restricted.
The proposal that the gains and losses on shares of widely- 
held Canadian corporations be accrued every five years for tax 
purposes seems to follow the logic of the Royal Commission’s 
arguments (although the Commission referred to “publicly-traded" 
securities). This simply seems to be a recognition of the ad­
vantages that the securities industry has for so long pointed to in 
the case of publicly-traded securities; they have an established 
value and the owners have liquidity. However, the precise ar­
rangements are somewhat puzzling. The omission of debt securi­
ties from the requirement of periodic valuation seems reasonable 
since, where an investor buys such a security on issue and holds it 
until maturity, there will be little if any gain or loss. Recognizing
20 Benson, op. cit. supra fn. 3, p. 44.
21 Conway, op cit. supra fn. 15, p. 165.
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interim gains or losses (largely a result of changing interest rates) 
which would offset each other in the long run seems unnecessary. 
Where a debt instrument is sold, any gain or loss would be 
caught under the realization principle. However, it should be 
recognized that perpetual debt obligations (such as the Canada 
perpetuáis or the C .P.R .’s consolidated debenture stock) should 
be treated as “shares” for tax purposes since they have no ma­
turity date.
It is not clear why all marketable securities were not sub­
jected to the five year valuation rule.22 Even though only one 
half of the gains on Canadian shares will be taxable compared with 
full taxation of gains on all other shares, so long as losses can 
be fully deducted from other income, when realized, and so long 
as gains need never be realized, even at death, it would seem to be 
more attractive for Canadians to invest in foreign shares than in 
Canadian shares.
The Realization Principle
How appropriate is the “realization” principle as a criterion 
for the appropriate time at which to levy a tax on capital gains? 
Where a tax is to be levied on the basis of the value of something 
then two conditions must be met. First, it must be possible to 
determine the value of the item with a reasonable degree of pre­
cision and without undue cost, and, second, the taxpayer must 
be in a position to pay the tax without undue hardship. When 
people receive wages, salary, interest and dividends, these are 
normally received in cash and thus there is neither a valuation 
problem nor a liquidity problem. Thus it is convenient to tax 
these benefits, which probably accounts, in part, for them norm­
ally being subject to excessive taxation. (The White Paper pro­
poses that the tax rate on ordinary income will reach fifty per cent 
at the twenty-five thousand dollar level although it is prepared to 
permit important capital gains to escape taxation indefinitely be­
cause it would be “inconvenient” for the taxpayer to have them 
taxed even at death.)
Are the problems of valuation and of liquidity so serious that 
considerations of equity must be foregone? Mr. Benson appar­
ently thinks so since he reiterated on March 10th that deemed 
realization on death was impractical since “there are some 
assets where the lack of marketability makes this treatment com­
75 Of course shares subject to exchange control would have to be ex­
empted but such an exemption is already provided for in the case of 
ordinary income by s. 54 (7 ) of the Income Tax Act. R.S.C. 1952, 
c. 148, as amended.
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pelling”. But the Royal Commission clearly thought otherwise 
when it said:
If the full taxation of property Rains would result in dire eco­
nomic consequences or hopelessly complex administrative ques­
tions, some backing away from equity principles could be 
justified. We are satisfied that neither result would come about.23
Clearly in the case of marketable securities there would hardly 
seem to be any significant problems of valuation or of liquidity. 
However, even here objections are sometimes raised. For ex­
ample, substantial blocks of shares might have a different value 
than that indicated by small transactions. A controlling interest is 
usually worth a premium but this should cause no difficulties since 
the accrued gains would be less and the accrued losses more than 
what would probably have occurred under realization. Although 
large minority interests might actually bring less than the “market” 
price the resulting inequity would probably be less than what would 
result from permitting such accrued gains to escape tax indef­
initely.
Liquidity is probably a greater problem than valuation, but 
it seems inequitable to tax the investor who shifts from one 
investment to another yet to leave the investor who continues to 
hold the same assets free of tax. One consequence of such treat­
ment is to create a “locked-in” situation since the investor will 
prefer to avoid tax. As Conway has pointed out,24 it is not the 
existence of a capital gains tax that creates this “locked-in” effect 
but rather the possibility of deferring the tax for long periods or 
indefinitely. In any case, an investor who sells, say, Polaroid (on 
which he has a gain) to invest in Xerox, has hardly realized any­
thing. Liquidity problems would only arise where the appreciation 
in value had been substantial and in such cases the owner would 
probably be able to borrow against his shares to pay the tax. And, 
as the Royal Commission pointed out, the shareholder need not 
wait until the taxes are due in order to begin an orderly liquida­
tion. Furthermore, the taxpayer should be given a reasonable 
time to pay any tax where there has been no realization. Conway 
suggests ten years at death25 and the United Kingdom legislation 
permits installment payments over an eight year period with inter­
est26. The new Canada Estates Act permits payments to be spread 
over six years and there seems to be no reason why the same
** Report of the Royal Commission on Taxation, op. cit. supra fn. 1, 
vol. 1, p. 14.
24 Conway, op. cit. supra fn 15, p. 309.
25 Ibid.. p. 198.
™ Wheatcroft and Park, op. cit. supra fn. 19, s. 23.13.
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option should not be available for capital gains tax although, where 
both estate and capital gains taxes are payable, a longer period 
might well be appropriate. Interest should, of course, be charged 
on any unpaid taxes.
A final objection is that owners might lose their controlling 
interest. This might be avoided by borrowing against their shares 
as already suggested or by another method to be described later. 
But in any case should those who control businesses be permitted 
to escape taxes on their capital gains forever just because of that 
fact?
In the case of closely-held corporations, partnership inter­
ests and real estate holdings, valuation and liquidity problems 
would be more serious than with marketable shares. In the case 
of real estate, neither problem seems to have prevented municipal­
ities from levying taxes assessed on the valuation of such prop­
erties. The problem of valuation is, in any case, becoming easier 
all the time since, with the growth of government transfer pay­
ments (particularly for educational purposes) provinces are 
now taking steps to ensure that all real estate will be valued on the 
same basis throughout the province. These valuations are usually 
at “market” and are normally kept up-to-date. Such valuations 
might well be accepted by the federal government with the values 
being adjusted by an appropriate percentage in those cases where 
a particular municipality did not assess at current “market”.
The valuation of a business is a more difficult matter but 
such a valuation must be made at death in any case for estate tax 
purposes so no additional work would be involved at that 
time. Of course an initial valuation at “valuation day” would be 
required. To ease this problem the government might adopt the 
recommendation of the Carter Commission that taxpayers have the 
option of valuing property by using their original cost and pro­
rating their gain or loss between the taxable and the tax-free 
periods on the assumption that the gain or loss had accrued uni­
formly over time.
The liquidity problem is a more serious one since the sale 
of a minority interest in a business would likely be difficult, if 
not impossible, where the business was a small one. However, it 
should be recognized that the owners of some businesses are 
illiquid by choice. Obviously companies such as Eaton’s and 
other large private companies could be converted into widely- 
held companies and a market established for their shares if the 
owners chose to do so. Is there, then, any justification for per­
mitting the owners of such large, closely-held businesses to defer 
taxes on their capital gains even until death, just because they
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choose to keep their assets illiquid and avoid establishing a market 
value for them? Corporations beyond a designated size might be 
deemed to be widely-held corporations with gains and losses on 
their shares being accrued every five years.27 To simplify valua- 
ation problems and to increase their liquidity, some of these firms 
might choose to “go public”. Where they did not do so it 
would probably be necessary to permit minority shareholders 
(who were not members of the controlling group) to defer accru­
ing capital gains until death since they could face very serious 
liquidity problems over which they would have no control. In any 
case, the private company may be in the process of disappearing. 
The British have already abolished it, and amendments have been 
introduced into Parliament this session which, if passed, would 
require all federal corporations with sales or assets in excess of 
three million dollars to publish their financial statements. Were 
the provinces to follow the federal lead the chief advantage of the 
private company —  privacy of its financial affairs —  would be 
ended.
In the case of independent private businesses —  as distinct 
from private companies that are subsidiaries of public corporations
—  there are additional factors to be considered in addition to 
equitable treatment for all taxpayers. Since there seems to be a 
tendency for large firms to grow larger by absorbing competitors, 
any action which would encourage such consolidations would 
seem to be undesirable. So would anything which led to more 
Canadian firms being sold to foreign interests. Furthermore, it 
has been argued that there is a distinct social benefit to be ob­
tained from the existence of small businesses controlled by inde­
pendent businessmen.28 Obviously, anything which increases the 
liquidity problems of small firms is likely to cause more of them 
to be sold to other firms or to foreign owners. The estate tax
97 Some indication of how large a firm must be to be able to “go public” 
might be inferred from the fact that half of the two hundred stock 
issues of firms which went public in Canada from 1956 to 1968 were 
under $500,000. See David C. Shaw, H ot N ew  Issues; H ow W ell D:> 
They Perform?, 34 Business Quarterly 42 (No. 2, 1969). Somewhat the 
same picture is obtained in the United States where more than half of 
the new (non-rights) issues of stock in the 1950s and early 1960s 
were for less than $500,000 (These figures do not distinguish be­
tween firms going public and additional issues from firms already 
public): Irwin Friend et al., Investment Banking and the New Issues 
Market (Cleveland, 1967), p. 32.
9S See Estes Kefauver, In a Few Hands: Monopoly Power in America 
(Baltimore, 1965), c. 5, entitled “Monopoly and the Community”, for 
a discussion of the social advantages said to result from retaining 
small businesses and small businessmen.
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already creates liquidity problems in spite of the provision for 
installment payments. Although it is sometimes argued that some 
businesses should be exempt from estate taxes —  the argument has 
been made most recently on behalf of independent newspapers—  
it would appear to be impossible to justify such an exemption on 
grounds of equity to all taxpayers.
A Possible Solution to the Liquidity Problem
The British who, interestingly enough, do tax capital gains at 
death (subject to certain exemptions) have taken additional steps
—  beyond installment payments —  to ease the liquidity problems 
for owners of small firms. In 1952, a number of insurance firms 
and investment trusts created Estate Duties Investment Trust Ltd. 
(E D IT H ) which:
If satisfied about the soundness of the management and the 
prospects of a private company, . . . will supply the funds needed 
to meet estate duty liabilities without requiring representation on 
the board of directors. Thus EDITH acts as a minority share­
holder of undisputed financial strength without the control or 
policy of the business being affected. Arrangements can be under­
taken in anticipation of death duty liabilities . . . .  EDITH also 
acquires shares in small public companies with a restricted 
market.29
There would seem to be no reason why the Canadian govern­
ment should not encourage the creation of EDITHs; in addition, 
the long-heralded Canada Development Corporation might serve 
the same purpose. It would seem to be desirable to have more 
than one source of funds available to owners and they would 
probably prefer that at least some of the sources were non-gov­
ernment. Such corporations could also provide a market for 
shares of widely-held corporations where substantial blocks have 
to be disposed of for tax or other reasons and where the market 
is thin. Thus, the same institutional arrangements would alleviate 
the problems created by estate and capital gains taxes, and would 
help to prevent increased concentration of industry and the sale of 
Canadian firms to foreign owners.30
Of course not all firms will qualify to have their shares pur­
chased by EDITHs. But should the government grant tax con­
2n C. T. Sandford, Taxing Inheritance and Capital Gains (2nd ed., Lon­
don, 1967), pp. 37-38.
30 The seriousness of the liquidity problem may well be over-estimated. 
A study made for the Royal Commission claimed that small businesses 
were seldom sold either to meet or in anticipation of estate taxes, but 
rather for other and purely business reasons. See J. G. Smith, D. B. 
Fields, and E. J. Mockler, Death Taxes. Studies of the Royal Commis­
sion on Taxation (Ottawa, 1964), Number 11, pp. 18-20.
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cessions to enable managements to remain in control where there 
are doubts about “the soundness of the management and the 
prospects of a . . . company?”
Assets Held for Personal Use and Enjoyment
The Royal Commission had pointed out that the tax base 
should:
. . . include imputed income, that is, the gains realized when a 
person uses or consumes his own personal services or his own 
property.31
The justification for this approach is that when a person pur­
chases services in the market, income is created which would be 
subject to tax. Where a person invests his money in earning 
assets and then rents a house for his own use, both his income 
from the investments and the landlord’s rental income will be 
subject to tax while, if he uses the same funds to buy a house 
which he occupies, there is no investment income subject to tax 
and there is no tax on the imputed income from occupying the 
house. However, after making the case for including imputed 
income in the tax base on the grounds of equity, the Royal Com­
mission concluded that:
In most circumstances, however, . . .  the valuation and adminis­
trative problems involved in including such amounts in income 
are insuperable.32
The Commission supported its position by reference to the aband­
onment of the taxation of imputed rent in Britain in 1962 after 
many years, because of the difficulty of determining fair rental 
values, but it pointed out that this provides a substantial preference 
for home ownership.33
The tax treatment of these assets can conveniently be dealt 
with by treating “the principal residence” separately from the 
other assets.
(i) The “Principal Residence” . Not only did Carter give up the 
idea of taxing imputed income of owner-occupied housing, but he 
proposed a lifetime exemption of twenty-five thousand dollars of 
gains on such homes from tax. The United States has always 
included capital gains on residences in income subject to tax but 
the roll-over provisions and the forgiveness of tax at death have
31 Report of the Royal Commission on Taxation, op. cit. supra fn. 1, 
vol. 3, p. 41.
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid., p. 48.
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meant that most such gains escape tax.34 In the United Kingdom 
all such gains are exempt. Mr. Benson’s proposal for an ex­
emption of one thousand dollars a year of gains is probably an 
improvement over the Commission proposals, although the argu­
ments used in support of the exemption are questionable. A sys­
tem which excludes from tax the gains on most homes might well 
be justified on the grounds of administrative convenience, and it 
might also be considered politically expedient if the necessary 
support were to be obtained for a broad programme of tax re­
form. Nevertheless, these are not the arguments Mr. Benson 
uses when he says:
Nevertheless, the government does not feel that it would be ap­
propriate to treat the homeowner’s gain as ordinary income. 
Home ownership is part of the Canadian way of life, and within 
reasonable limits the profit on the sale of a personal residence 
would be treated as a recovery of the personal expenses of the 
hom eow ner.35
Homeownership is part of the “Canadian way of life” in the sense 
that about two-thirds of dwellings are owner-occupied, although 
Quebec differs significantly from the rest of Canada since there 
only half are owner-occupied (and only a third in metropolitan 
areas). More significantly, in recent years two-thirds of accom­
modation built in metropolitan areas of Canada —  and this is 
where most of the construction has been —  has been rental ac ­
commodation. The desirability of added preferences for home­
owners over those who occupy rental accommodation is asserted 
rather than justified.
The argument that homeowners should be entitled to “the 
recovery of . . . personal expenses” is difficult to reconcile with 
the position taken only two pages later in the White Paper when, 
in dealing with “other personal assets”, it is asserted that:
. . .  it would also be necessary to impose some overall limitations 
on the deductibility of losses. Otherwise, some taxpayers could 
reduce their taxable income by deducting personal expenses.36
The roll-over provision for housing also seems to be inequit­
able since it is to be provided that:
. . .  a taxpayer who moves from one area to another within 
Canada in connection with a change of job should be entitled 
to treat the sale of his home and the purchase of a home in the 
new area as a non-taxable transaction.37
34 There is also a partial exemption on sales by persons 65 or over. See 
Martin David, op. cit. supra fn. 18, p. 13.
35 Benson, op. cit. supra fn. 3, p. 37. Emphasis added.
36 Ibid., p. 39. Emphasis added.
37 Ibid.
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It seems difficult to justify this discrimination against the tax­
payer who finds it necessary to move in order to get a larger home 
to accommodate an expanding family or one nearer to schools. 
If roll-overs are to be permitted they should be available to every­
one, but there should be a deemed realization at death.
The further restriction that the receipts from the sale of a 
residence must be reinvested within a year (this is also the pro­
vision in the United States) seems unduly restrictive since some 
people may not be able to find suitable property within that time 
or may be in the course of a series of short-term moves where it 
would not be reasonable to acquire a new residence until the series 
of moves was completed. This problem could be dealt with by 
permitting the taxpayer to deposit the funds with the government 
for up to, say, five years (C arter had recommended such “income 
adjustment accounts” to permit taxpayers who received large 
windfalls to distribute them over a number of years but the tech­
nique would seem equally suitable for handling roll-overs).38
(ii) Other Assets Held for Personal Use and Enjoyment. Losses 
on non-depreciable assets such as sculptures, paintings and jewel­
lery are to be deductible but only from gains on other assets of 
the same class. This seems reasonable except that the taxpayer is 
only to be permitted to carry losses backward or forward for one 
year rather than backward two years and forward indefinitely 
as reccn;mended by Carter. This seems quite inequitable since, 
as Conway pointed out:
. . .  a limitation on the loss carry-over will usually operate to 
the disadvantage of the lower income taxpayer, while it is only a 
limited restriction on the higher income taxpayer for the higher 
income taxpayer will have gains available that can be realized 
before the loss expires.39
The incentive to Convert Income to Capital Gains 
The White paper says:
. . .  it has been possible for the sophisticated to arrange their 
transactions in such a way that they receive as capital gains 
amounts that would have been income had the transaction been 
carried out in the normal manner.40
The exemption for capital gains has also encouraged taxpayers 
to make determined and persistent efforts to receive their income 
in that form, since then it would not bear tax.41
3R Report of the Royal Commission on Taxation, op. cit. supra fn. 1, 
vol. 3, p. 259.
39 Conway, op. cit. supra fn. 15, p. 194.
40 Benson, op. cit. supra fn. 3, p. 36.
41 Ibid.. p. 37.
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Presumably, it is loopholes of the above type that the introduction 
of the capital gains tax is intended to close. But so long as capital 
gains need never be brought into income for tax, even at death, 
there remains every incentive to receive as much “income” as 
possible in the form of “capital gains”. The existence of a capital 
gains tax in the United States has not led taxpayers there to give 
up this practice. So long as the tax rate on capital gains is less 
than on income (which it will be for shares of widely-held Ca­
nadian corporations), or tax on such gains can be postponed in­
definitely, capital gains will be more attractive than income. Thus, 
although it is no doubt true that:
If capital gains are included in income for tax purposes, the por­
tion of the total income of the well-to-do that is brought to tax 
would be dramatically increased.42 
not all capital gains would be brought to tax. Conway estimates 
that if there were a deemed realization on death or at gifting of 
capital gains it would add ten per cent to thirty per cent to United 
States capital gains tax revenue.43
Mr. Benson seems to have assumed that those who are cur­
rently able to receive “income” as “capital gains” realize their 
“capital gains” in order to consume the benefits. But in most cases 
this is unlikely to be the case since recipients of large incomes 
typically save a substantial portion, and if they can receive that 
portion as a capital gain it will still escape tax (except where it is 
in the form of shares of widely-held Canadian corporations, al­
though even here gains will be taxed at only half the rate applic­
able to “income” ). In this connection it would appear that firms 
(such as subsidiaries of foreign corporations) that can offer their 
executives stock options in the form of shares of the foreign 
parent would have an advantage over Canadian corporations, since 
there would apparently be no deemed realization of gains on the 
foreign shares subsequent to acquisition.
The only loophole that seems to have been firmly closed is 
the one that permitted shareholders to get their benefits through 
the retention of earnings by the corporation and the subsequent 
tax-free appreciation of the shares, rather than through taxable 
dividends. In future, Canadian corporations will, in effect, be 
forced to distribute their earnings in order to make the “credit­
able” tax available to their shareholders (this can be done 
through stock dividends so that no cash need be paid out). The 
loophole is closed by the decision to eliminate a source of capital
42 ib id .. p. 38.
43 Conway, op. cit. supra fn. 15, p. 259.
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gains —  i.e. retained earnings —  rather than by any attempt to 
tax the resulting gains.
Electric, Steam and Gas Utilities
The White Paper proposes to deny to holders of shares in 
these utilities any creditable tax on their dividends, even though 
the corporation has paid tax. It is argued that:
The whole scheme of the present proposals contemplates that 
shareholders of Canadian corporations receive a credit from the 
federal government for part or all of the federal corporation tax 
paid by their corporation. It would be contrary to this general 
scheme if the federal government gave to shareholders of these 
utility corporations credit for taxes which the federal government 
has turned over to the provincial government, and it does not 
propose to do so.44 
But the creditable tax for other corporations is not, in fact, to be 
limited to the federal tax of forty per cent but is to be provided 
at a fifty per cent rate, which means that there will be a federal 
creditable tax equal to a provincial levy of ten per cent. In addi­
tion, the federal government makes grants to provinces for specific 
purposes including many which are not available to all provinces 
on equal terms. There seems to be no inherent reason why this 
grant, which is based on the amount of taxes paid by certain 
utility companies, should have any effect on the shareholders of 
those utilities. Mr. Sharp, when he introduced the Public Utilities 
Tax Transfer Act of 1966 said:
. . .  the purpose of this legislation is to avoid giving an artificial 
inducement to any province to nationalize its public utilities . . . .45
The denial of the tax credit to shareholders would seem likely to 
result in an increased cost of capital to such companies, and thus 
possibly negate the benefit intended by the Act. It is, in fact, 
not easy to predict just what will happen. The provinces could 
return the funds to the companies and they could pay higher 
dividends. Relatively higher yields on such securities would seem 
to make them relatively more attractive to foreign investors than to 
Canadians (for whom they would be no more attractive than 
lower yield shares carrying the tax credit). This could produce 
results in conflict with our apparent desires to encourage Cana­
dians to invest in Canadian equities. Another possibility is that 
such companies would cease to pay dividends since no creditable 
tax would be involved. Shares should grow in value through the 
retention of earnings and the increase in value would accrue to the
44 Benson, op. cit. supra fn. 3, p. 57.
43 House of Commons Debates (1966), 15 Eliz. II. vol. 7. p. 6903.
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shareholders as capital gains taxable only at fifty per cent of 
normal rates for income if the firms are widely-held.
Summary and Conclusions
One of the major weaknesses of the present tax system, as 
the White Paper points out, is that although the marginal tax 
rate rises above seventy-five per cent when taxable income ex­
ceeds $250,000, few people pay tax at such a rate, since the 
well-to-do can usually manage to arrange to obtain any substan­
tial benefits in the form of capital gains, which are currently tax- 
free. Although the White Paper claims to correct this inequity 
by proposing a tax on capital gains, there will still be major loop­
holes which will permit some people to escape both income and 
capital gains taxes.
Although the White Paper makes the entirely laudable pro­
posal that capital gains should be taxed at full income tax rates, 
in most cases, in order to remove the incentive to seek to convert 
income to capital gains, nevertheless by failing to provide for a 
deemed realization at death it will still be possible for some people 
to avoid taxes on their benefits indefinitely. Thus most of the 
incentives to convert income into capital gains will remain, and 
therefore it is essential to provide for a deemed realization at death.
Even if there were a deemed realization at death, the ap­
parent intention to permit an unlimited right to offset capital losses 
against income could make the new system even more inequitable 
than the present one. Taxpayers would be able to obtain the tax 
benefits from any losses without having to bring any of their gains 
into income for tax purposes, at least until death. This inequity 
can only be prevented by allowing losses to be used only to offset 
gains. There might, however, be provision for a modest offset —  
say, of $1,000 as in the United States —  against ordinary income. 
Such a provision would be of primary benefit to the person of 
moderate income who might well never have a gain to offset a 
loss. Of course, when gains are brought into tax at death there 
should be a generous averaging provision over previous years.
Where gains and losses are to be accrued every five years 
there would seem to be no inequity in permitting losses to be off­
set against ordinary income since all gains will also be brought 
into income. However, the five year accrual provision should be 
extended to include all marketable shares and not just those of 
widely-held Canadian corporations. Consideration should also 
be given to designating all Canadian corporations that are large 
enough to “go public”, as widely-held corporations.
In cases where assets are not liquid at the time of death the 
taxpayer should be permitted to pay any tax due in installments
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over a period of years —  as is now permitted under the Estate 
Tax Act —  provided that interest at the going rate is charged on 
any unpaid balance. In addition, the government should take 
steps to ease the liquidity problem by arranging for the creation 
of financial institutions, like the British EDITH, which could ac­
quire some of the shares of closely-held firms without necessarily 
forcing the owners to give up control. Provision might even be 
made for payment in “kind” with the shares so acquired being 
turned over to the Canada Development Corporation or the In­
dustrial Development Bank.46
The above provisions should remove any excuse for per­
mitting any capital gains to escape taxation indefinitely. How­
ever, if it is still thought that there would be undue hardship it 
would certainly be more equitable to reduce the tax rate on 
capital gains —  and if necessary even on estates —  but ensure 
that all gains would be taxed than to introduce the proposed 
system which would levy taxes at full income tax rates on some 
capital gains, but allow others to go untaxed indefinitely.
The roll-over provision for the “principal residence” should 
be made available regardless of the reasons for the change of 
residence, but there should be a deemed realization on the death 
of the owner —  or of the surviving spouse. There should be a 
right to carry forward losses on “assets held for personal use and 
enjoyment” indefinitely in order to provide equitable treatment 
for the less wealthy taxpayer.
Investors in the shares of electric, gas or steam utilities 
should be entitled to creditable tax on the same basis as investors 
in other Canadian shares. What the government subsequently does 
with the tax collected seems irrelevant.
46 Sec I. H. Asper, The Benson Iceberg (Toronto, 1970), p. 3, where it is 
pointed out that “as far back as 1400 B.C. the Egyptian pharoahs 
permitted the wealthy to pay their taxes in ‘kind’. Thus each year the 
subjects would bring to the pharoah their most favoured or valued 
possessions, including wives and animals.” Probably the government 
would wish to limit this option to corporate shares.
